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1. Introduction 
The term krusob, which simply means the crosses, is derived from 
a religious cult.1 It is frequently used to denote the several thousand 
speakers of Yucatec Maya who now occupy the central part of the 
Mexican state of Quintana Roo in the east of the Yucatan peninsula.2 
They are descendants of the rebels who fought against the government 
of Yucatan in the rebellion that began in 1847. This uprising, known 
as the Caste War of Yucatan, was primarily supported by a section 
of the Maya-speaking lower class. It was the most significant of the 
many rural uprisings that unsettled Mexico during the nineteenth cen-
tury (González Navarro 1976; Reina 1980). After some initial success 
in 1847/48, the rebels were forced to retreat to the isolated south-
eastern part of the peninsula, where they established independent poli-
ties. The result was a bloody frontier war that continued for more than 
fifty years. The rebel descendants preserved political autonomy de 
facto up to the first decades of the twentieth century. 
Krusob political organization in the second half of the nineteenth 
century has been characterized in different ways. Some scholars con-
sider it to be a chiefdom (Villa Rojas 1945) or an aggregate of several 
                                                     
1 I would like to thank Paul Sullivan for his critical comments on an earlier version 
of this paper. 
2 Bartolomé/Barabas (1977: 87) estimated their number to be around 6,000 in 
1970. The rebels usually referred to themselves as cristianoob (Christians), otsi-
lob (poor), or masewalob. The term krusob (crosses), in comparison, appears 
only rarely (For cristianoob, otsilob, and masewalob cf. e.g., Proclamation of 
Juan de la Cruz (Bricker 1981: 188-207); Libro sagrado (Chi Poot 1982: 277-
294); Juan de la Cruz, Chan Santa Cruz, February 1, 1850 (Quintal Martín 1992: 
68); for krusob cf. Libro sagrado, March 15, 1903 (Chi Poot 1982: 285); 
A. Dzul, R. Pec, and A. Chi to governor, January 8, 1888, in R. T. Goldsworthy 
confidential dispatch, January 26, 1888, Colonial Office, 123/189 (Dumond 
1997: 359). Made popular by Reed (1964), however, it is frequently used by 
scholars and the wider public. 
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chiefdoms (Dumond 1977), while others see it as a centralized state.3 I 
will suggest in the following that, contrary to assuming a consolidated 
governmental structure, Krusob political organization should rather 
be understood as a form of caudillo politics. This is the analytical 
framework proposed by Eric Wolf and Edward Hansen (1967). They 
define caudillo politics as: 1. the emergence of armed patron-client 
sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and submission, and by 
a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms; 2. the lack of in-
stitutionalised means for succession to offices; 3. the use of violence 
in political competition; and 4. the repeated failures of incumbent 
leaders to guarantee their tenures as chieftains (Wolf/Hansen 1967: 
169; Riekenberg 1998: 201).4 
I will attempt to demonstrate the productivity of this approach 
with a brief discussion on some features of the peculiar form of politi-
cal organization that developed in the area controlled by the Krusob 
after 1850, with particular reference to the role of violence. 
 
2. The Beginnings 
The Yucatan Caste War, which upset the peninsula after independence 
from Spain in 1821, was the unexpected outcome of factional disputes 
between the Yucatecan elites. This opposition between two liberal 
factions determined political conflict from the end of the 1830s up to 
the 1850s. The factions were grouped around the politicians Santiago 
Méndez, representing the interests of the city of Campeche, and Mi-
guel Barbachano acting on behalf of the Mérida elite (Cline 1950, V: 
619-622; Betancourt Pérez/Sierra Villarreal 1989: 57-59, 111-113; 
Negrín Muñoz 1991: 59-62). As elsewhere in Mexico, Yucatan devel-
oped a pattern of politics characterized by rapid change of govern-
ment, frequent coups, and a marked instability of government institu-
tions. 
Since political parties with a solid organization and ideology were 
non-existent, the major political actors  Méndez and Barbachano  
                                                     
3 See Rugeley (1997: 495-496); Sapper (1895); Jones (1974: 659); Hostettler 
(1996: 19); Reed (1997: 523). 
4 The role of religion in caudillo political systems was not discussed by Wolf/Han-
sen (1967). However, its importance in Krusob political organization is obvious. 
The hypotheses I suggest here will have to be refuted or confirmed by future 
studies. 
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had to rely on multiple chains of vertical political alliances that linked 
politics at the peninsular, regional, and local levels. This included ties 
to the Maya-speaking population in the towns and villages of the hin-
terland, which were mainly secured by the batabob, as the caciques or 
governors of Indian town and village administrations (repúblicas de 
indígenas) were known as in Yucatan. 
Since 1839, Ladino5 leaders had begun to systematically recruit 
part of the Maya-speaking population as soldiers for the civil wars 
between the factions of the elite.6 The character of confrontation 
changed in 1847, when several groups, composed of members of the 
Maya-speaking lower classes, began to act independently and fight for 
their own agenda, which included the reduction of taxes, free access to 
land, and equal rights. Although many of these rebels were non-
Indians (vecinos), the uprising that followed has often been character-
ized as an ethnic or racial war.7 A critique of this interpretation, how-
ever, is not the focus of this paper (Gabbert 1997; 2000; n.d.). I will 
concentrate instead on the military and political organization that de-
veloped in the rebel forces during the decades that followed the out-
break of that war. 
Rebel fighting units were modelled initially on the Yucatecan 
militia. Companies consisted of men from individual towns who were 
led by elected officers under an elected captain, a position frequently 
filled by the local batab (Jones 1974: 665-666; Rugeley 1995: 486). 
Nominally they were grouped into larger units under majors (coman-
dantes) or generals. In actual fact, however, each company operated 
independently without a visible command structure (Reed 1964: 122-
123; Dumond 1977: 106-107; 1985: 292-293). Coordination at a more 
inclusive level was achieved only by the more or less stable attach-
ment of individual companies to the few leaders with regional influ-
                                                     
5 The term ladino is used in other parts of Middle America but not in Yucatan. 
Nevertheless, it seems more suitable than other terms (e.g., white) to describe the 
culturally and linguistically hispanicized section of the population, since it con-
tains less phenotypical and genetical connotations inappropriate to Yucatan. 
6 See Baqueiro (1990 [1878-1887], I: 228, 230-231, 234, 370); Ancona (1978 
[1879/80], IV: 17, 24); Norman (21843: 227); Stephens (1963 [1843], II: 160, 
226, 229); Reed (1964: 126). 
7 See Buisson (1978: 8, 21-22); Montalvo Ortega (1988: 301, 314); Quintal Martín 
(1988: 13); Bartolomé (1988: 179). 
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ence (caudillos), such as Jacinto Pat, Cecilio Chi, and Florentino 
Chan. 
In 1849, these overarching command structures collapsed. The re-
bels were thrown onto the defensive by government forces and within 
a few months two of their most important chiefs had been killed.8 
Moreover, many of the early batab company leaders had died in bat-
tle, companies were decimated and, depending on the fortunes of war, 
survivors joined other units (Reed 1964: 122-123; Rugeley 1995: 
486). 
Now, a second generation of leaders began to emerge. In addition 
to their ability to lead their followers on successful pillage raids, some 
of these rebel caudillos attempted to back up their leadership claims 
with alleged connections to supernatural forces.9 This was to be of 
significance in 1850, when José María Barrera and his men were 
forced to flee from advancing government troops. Although accounts 
differ greatly with regard to detail, there is evidence that they estab-
lished a new settlement around a natural well (cenote) that had once 
allegedly harboured three miraculous crosses with the power of 
speech. Known as Chan Santa Cruz or Little Holy Cross, this place 
became the centre of a religious cult, attracting hundreds of rebels 
who began to form villages in the vicinity.10 
In a desperate situation of near defeat and fragmented forces, the 
new Cult of the Speaking Cross became a key element in fostering 
                                                     
8 Cecilio Chi was murdered by his secretary in the spring of 1849, apparently for 
personal reasons. Jacinto Pat was killed by Venancio Pec in September of the 
same year as a result of trying to open negotiations with the government (Ancona 
1978 [1879/80], IV: 260-264). 
9 This seems to have been a frequent phenomenon among caudillos of lower-class 
background in Latin America (Riekenberg 1998: 204-205). 
10 See Manuel Micheltorena to governor, Mérida, April 2, 1851, El Siglo Diez y 
Nueve, Mérida, April 7, 1851, p. 1; Ancona (1978 [1879/80], IV: 314-316); 
Baqueiro (1990 [1878-87], IV: 118-123); Reed (1964: 135-136). Ladino sources 
generally depict the Cult of the Speaking Cross as a trick whereby leaders con-
sciously deceive their followers. This, of course, was standard practice in ideo-
logical warfare, and aimed at questioning the legitimacy of the rebel political 
structure. Whether the rebel leaders were true believers, as Paul Sullivan suggests 
(personal communication, 6/27/2002; see also Dumond 1997: 420), or not is hard 
to decide, given the limitations of existing sources. Suffice it to say here that the 
success of the cult suggests whatever the leaders did or said seems to have car-
ried conviction for their audience and obviously addressed the psychological 
needs of many of the insurgents. 
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cohesion among the rebels. It not only gave the rebels an interpreta-
tion of their destiny11 and inspired them with hope for a better future, 
but also provided inhabitants of different villages and followers of 
different leaders with a common point of ideological identification. 
 
3. Krusob political organization  structure or process? 
The following decades saw the emergence of a religious, military, and 
social organization that integrated several local groups. In his now 
classic book on the Caste War, Nelson Reed (1964: 212), following in 
the footsteps of Alfoso Villa Rojas (1945: 22-25), developed a dia-
gram of Krusob political organization which has had enormous influ-
ence on later scholars and the interested public. Under the heading 
Cruzob, 1850-1901 it shows, among other things, a three, respec-
tively four-tiered hierarchy of political and religious offices above the 
common people. The Patron of the Cross or tatich is placed at the 
top, the second tier is comprised of the Interpreter of the Cross (tata 
polin) and the General of the Plaza (tata chikiuc), followed by the 
priests and company officers that form the third tier, while the medi-
cine men (h-menob) and village secretaries (ahdzib huunob), subordi-
nate to the priests, make up the fourth and last tier. Although sche-
matic representations have their merits, they tend to emphasise struc-
ture12 rather than process and run the risk of suggesting stability even 
in cases where change has emerged as the outstanding quality of a 
certain historical development. This seems to be the case with Krusob 
society during the nineteenth century. Reeds schema assumes that: 
1. a stable authority structure existed; 
2. there was only one ritual centre13 and the highest religious leader 
(the Patron of the Cross) was the supreme authority of all Krusob; 
3. the relative importance of religious and political positions re-
mained fairly constant. 
                                                     
11 For example, by representing past defeat as a sanction for offending Gods orders 
(see Juan de la Cruz, X-Balam Nah, Xocen, Xcenil, Xocen, December 11, 1850, 
Villa Rojas 1945: 162). 
12 See Reed (1964: 160-161, 209-220) and to a lesser extent, Bartolomé/Barabas 
(1977: 33-35). 
13 Although he himself mentions the centre at Tulum (Reed 1964: 223-224). 
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A closer look at the sources leads me to doubt all three assump-
tions. 
1. There was apparently no stable political hierarchy in existence to 
govern the rebel population, but almost constant rivalry between lead-
ers for power and wealth. Thus, one traveller commented at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century:  
On the death of a head chief of the Santa Cruz Indians the oldest of the 
sub-chiefs is supposed to succeed him; as a matter of fact, there are al-
ways rival claimants for the chieftainship, and the sub-chief with the 
strongest personality or greatest popularity amongst the soldiers usually 
succeeds in grasping the office. There are nearly always rival factions 
endeavouring to oust the chief in power, and the latter rarely dies in bed 
(Gann 1924: 49; Adrian 1924: 237). 
 
Table 1: Causes of Death of Major Rebel Leaders 
Name Date Cause of death 
Cecilio Chi early 1849 killed by his secretary 
Jacinto Pat Sept. 1849 killed by rival leader 
Manuel Nahuat 3/23/1851 killed in battle 
Venancio Pec spring 1852 killed in battle 
Juan Bautista Yam spring 1852 killed in battle 
José María Barrera Dec. 1852 murdered? 
Paulino Pech May 1853 killed in battle 
Agustín Barrera Dec. 1863 killed by rival leaders 
Venancio Puc Dec. 1863 killed by rival leaders 
Apolinario Sánchez Dec. 1863 killed by rival leaders 
Bernardo Ueh Feb. 1864 killed in battle 
Dionisio Zapata April 1864 killed by rival leaders 
Leandro Santos April 1864 killed by rival leaders 
Pedro Tsul 1871 killed in battle 
Bonifacio Novelo July 1874? unclear 
Claudio Novelo July 1874? unclear 
Bernardino Ken Oct. 1875 killed in battle 
Juan de la Cruz Pat Oct. 1875 killed in battle 
Crescencio Poot Aug. 1885 killed by rival leader 
Juan Bautista Chuc Aug. 1885 killed by rival leaders 
José Crescencio Puc Sept.? 1894 killed by rival leaders 
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Name Date Cause of death 
Román Pec 1896 killed by rival leaders? 
José María Aké early 1897 killed by rival leaders 
Hilario Cab early 1897 killed by rival leaders 
José María Canul early 1897 killed by rival leaders 
José María Aguilar April 1897 killed by rival leaders 
Felipe Yama 1899 killed by rival leader 
Felipe May April 1901 killed by rival leader 
Sources: Razón del Pueblo, Mérida, August 5, 1874, and October 20, 1875, p. 1; 
Información practicada con Saturnino Fernández et al., Tekax, September 1886, 
AGEY, Poder Ejecutivo, box 241; Ancona [1879/80] 1978, IV: 80; Sapper (1895: 
197); Reed (1964: 109, 121-122, 227, 287-288); Jones (1974: 660, 676-677); Dumond 
(1985: 295, 301; 1997: 254-256, 381, 395); Angel (1997: 532). 
 
A look at Table 1, showing the causes of death of major Krusob lead-
ers, proves that this was not mere sensationalism. Whereas many 
Krusob leaders died in battle, the majority were victims of internal 
power struggles. This strongly suggests that violence was not an aber-
ration but an inherent feature of Krusob politics in the nineteenth 
century. It was one of several resources potential caudillos could make 
use of to gain and retain leadership positions. As has already been 
said, many of the first rebel chiefs were batabob, that is, men who 
could count on some traditional legitimacy, to adopt a Max Weber 
term, and wealth to attract followers.14 The next generation of leaders 
were all men of obscure origins, whose success was based on luck, 
audacity, military skill, and sheer personal charisma (Rugeley 1995: 
486).15 Having no significant property or status, these leaders felt a 
greater need than their predecessors to secure their followers loyalty 
with other means. Successful pillaging was initially the only course 
open to them in order to obtain the wealth to be distributed. The use of 
physical violence against their enemies, as well as against rivals for 
leadership or followers who questioned their authority was a neces-
                                                     
14 Pat, for example, was a personal acquaintance of Barbachano. He was an edu-
cated man and owned considerable landed property (Baqueiro 1990 [1878-87], II: 
140; Bricker 1981: 98). Pat, Chi and Chan were all batabob (Rugeley 1995: 486). 
15 José María Barrera, another example, did not play a role in the organization of 
the rebel forces up to 1850. He does not appear in the correspondence of that 
time (Jones 1974: 669). Bonifacio Novelo had been a peddler, agitator, and gen-
eral riffraff before the war (Rugeley 1995: 492-493, note 34). 
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sary evil in maintaining their position. As Wolf and Hansen pointed 
out,  
the claimants to victory must be prepared to kill their rivals and to dem-
onstrate this willingness publicly. For the loser there is no middle 
ground; he must submit to the winner, or be killed. [...] Given the terms 
of competition, violence constitutes a predictable aspect of the system. 
Leadership can be achieved only through violence; resources claimed 
only through violence (Wolf/Hansen 1967: 174, 177; Riekenberg 1998: 
210-211). 
Consequently, leaders required a specific personality or, at least, an 
assertive image that expressed masculinity and the ready use of vio-
lence. This is aptly illustrated in the following description of Bernar-
dino Ken, one of the rebel chiefs in the 1860s and 1870s:  
Although he is of advanced age, the strength of his character, his eminent 
services and sanguinary instincts make him dreadful not only among his 
followers but even to Poot himself who is also respected and feared as a 
leader of major rank. In his bacchanals Cen even takes the liberty to kill 
anybody who gets in his way [...].16 
The excessive consumption of alcohol has frequently been interpreted 
as a pathological trait and especially Yucatecan sources depict the 
rebel leaders as bloodthirsty drunkards.17 However, heavy drinking 
may have been an essential component of the social assertion of mas-
culinity in a male-dominated context. 
2. The Cult of the Speaking Cross has been frequently been depicted 
as a unitary movement with a single ritual centre at Chan Santa Cruz 
in the nineteenth century (Villa Rojas 1945: 22-25; Reed 1964; 
Bricker 1981). However, Don Dumond (1985: 291; 1997: 421-422) 
has convincingly argued that not only was there a tendency to 
fragment politically but also toward real and profound fission [...] 
inherent also in the cult. He has shown that after 1853 several 
essentially independent and equal religious centres emerged in the 
Krusob area, which drew on separate constituencies. A separate ritual 
centre existed in the 1850s at Mabén, 40 kilometers north-east of 
                                                     
16 La Guerra de Castas, La Razón del Pueblo, Mérida, March 29, 1871, p. 2; see 
also Antonio Espinosa to governor, Valladolid, February 28, 1871, La Razón del 
Pueblo, Mérida, March 1, 1871, p. 1. 
17 See, for example, Comisión del gobierno de Yucatán [...], Mérida, June 13, 
1864, La Nueva Época, Mérida, June 24, 1864, p. 2. 
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Valladolid, which was shifted to Kantunilkin in 1858 as a result of 
frequent army attacks. Other ritual centres emerged at Tulum in 1864, 
at Muyil in the early 1870s and, possibly at Chunpom around the same 
time or later. All of these places had a church with several crosses, as 
well as a number of barracks where men from the villages attached 
lived during their periodic guard services (guardia).18 The sources 
also indicate that Patron of the Cross was not a unique title but one 
held by individuals in the ritual centres mentioned (Miller 1889: 26; 
Dumond 1985: 296-297, 300-301; 1997: 317-319, 371). 
There is, in fact, a hierarchy of crosses in the Krusob religious sys-
tem. Patron crosses (also called saints) are seen as intermediaries be-
tween God and man, while domestic crosses are held to protect the 
elementary family. Some domestic crosses gain prestige by virtue of 
their exceptional powers and become the patron of all families belong-
ing to a patrilineage. The lineage cross, which is ascribed the greatest 
power, becomes the patron cross of the village and is kept in the vil-
lage church. Finally, a village cross can acquire such regional impor-
tance that homage is widely paid and guard service performed (Miller 
1889: 26; Villa Rojas 1945: 97-98; Dumond 1985: 295). It seems ob-
vious that a potential for fragmentation lies within such a system, 
since crosses differ not in kind but in their degree of supernatural 
power, of which there may be conflicting evaluations. As Don Du-
mond puts it:  
As the quasi-military company was the building block of the segmental 
political organization, so it was also the unit of worship and guardia in 
the religion of the oracular crosses. And thus it is no surprise to find that 
the periodic fragmentation of political rule was accompanied inevitably 
by fragmentation of the religious organization, or that regional splinters 
within the religious cult became the separatist centers of diverging poli-
ties (Dumond 1985: 303). 
3. It appears that the relationship between religious and secular 
power was by no means stable.19 While José María Barrera, who is 
generally seen as the founder of the cult, succeeded in attracting nu-
                                                     
18 All male Krusob who were married or over sixteen years of age were required to 
guard the major military and cult centres for fixed terms (Villa Rojas 1945: 24; 
Sullivan 1997, II: 3). 
19 This point has been already stressed by Jones (1974) and Dumond (1977, espe-
cially p. 126). 
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merous followers, it is still not clear whether he was also able to estab-
lish unchallenged political authority over the rebels.20 An early ser-
mon of the Speaking Cross that survived in written form complained 
about the disobedience of many military leaders and can be interpreted 
as an indication of factional conflict: [...] there are very few generals 
that come because none of the generals believe in any of my ordi-
nances and the generals say that there is no truth whatever in my or-
ders [...].21 
Barrera died in 1852 and there is a great dearth of information on the 
rebel politics of the years that followed. It does, however, seem to be 
clear that Venancio Puc established himself as the highest religious 
and military leader in 1857 or earlier. His claim to political supremacy 
was thus backed by his religious authority.22 However, this state of 
affairs only lasted until December 1863, when Puc was killed by two 
of his generals (Dionisio Zapata and Leandro Santos). They not only 
questioned Pucs political position but also his charismatic authority 
as Patron of the Cross and, apparently, also several aspects of the cult 
itself.23 After a further coup only four months later, authority was 
more or less evenly shared by three leaders. According to a report by a 
British visitor, one of them (Bonifacio Novelo) acted as the head of 
the church while his fellow leaders (Crescencio Poot and Bernardino 
Ken) were mainly concerned with military affairs.24 Poot probably 
became supreme in late 1868.25 According to Jones (1974: 677-678) 
and Dumond (1977: 125-126; 1985: 299), the cult and its priests lost 
                                                     
20 But see Jones (1974: 676). 
21 Juan de la Cruz, X-Balam Nah, Xocen, Xcenil, Xocen, December 11, 1850, Villa 
Rojas (1945: 162). Jones (1974: 668-669) has already made this point. 
22 See, for example, Aldherre (1869: 75); Jones (1974: 670-674). Puc did also 
participate in military expeditions (e.g. Jones 1974: 672; Dumond 1997: 221, 
252, 259). 
23 See, for example, Angel Dugall to Pantaleon Barrera, Corozal, n.d. [the docu-
ment is dated 15 del pasado and although the year is not mentioned, the letters 
content suggests that it was written in 1864], CAIHDY, XLIV-1850-1859, 004; 
Jones (1974: 675); Dumond (1985: 298; 1997: 254-256, 258). 
24 See John Carmichael to Longdon, Corozal, November 15, 1867, Archives of 
Belize (Belmopan), Record 96, printed in Rugeley (2001: 82-87); Jones (1974: 
676-677). 
25 The reason for this development is not clear. According to Dumond (1997: 303), 
Novelos name never cropped up in an active context again in the documents. 
See also Bricker (1981: 112, 339, note 58). 
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much of their political influence the patron of the cross at Chan Santa 
Cruz no longer gave secular orders, and administration was almost 
fully secularized. They suggest that civil-military leadership became 
separated from the ritual leadership.26 By comparison, Paul Sullivan 
(personal communication, 6/27/2002) argues for the continuity of the 
cult and its forms, as well as its role in Krusob society. He rightly 
stresses that the cult did not completely lose its political significance 
and that military leaders remained true believers.27 Villa Rojas de-
scription of Krusob society in the 1930s supports to a certain extent 
both points of view. On one hand, it differentiates between the ritual 
and political roles in office and, on the other hand, makes clear that 
this separation was, however, far from complete since the ritual leader 
continued to play a role in secular matters (1945: 72, 92-93). It is im-
possible to resolve this point here. However, I would argue that al-
though Krusob politics did not become an entirely secular affair, 
there are clear indications that the relation between and the relative 
importance of religious and political positions changed over time. 
Whereas some leaders held the uppermost ritual and political positions 
simultaneously (e.g., Venancio Puc), they were held by different peo-
ple in other periods (e.g., Novelo and Poot between 1864 and 1868). 
Furthermore, while all important leaders lived in Chan Santa Cruz for 
many years, there were no permanent residents there from the 1880s 
onwards, as the Krusob and their leaders lived dispersed throughout 
the surrounding villages.28 
 
4. Conclusion 
Leadership positions among the Krusob were mainly based on per-
sonal loyalty and face-to-face relationships. I agree, therefore, with 
Don Dumond (1985: 302) that the ability of the political leaders to 
unify their followers was sharply limited in both the number of people 
they could organize and the size of the area they could dominate. 
                                                     
26 The supremacy of the religious leaders in Tulum persisted up to 1892, when the 
inhabitants vacated the place (Jones 1974: 678; Dumond 1985: 301-302, 369). 
27 In fact, an anonymous report mentions Poot as the Governor or First Gen-
eral, who communicates directly with the Cross (Anonymous to Guillermo 
Palomino, n.l., [1873?], printed in Rugeley 2001: 95). 
28 See Anonymous Report on Rebel Military Capacity, 1878, printed in Rugeley 
(2001: 88); Miller (1889: 25, 27); Dumond (1977: 125). 
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Since the economic foundations of domination were weak  leaders, 
for example, did not control the basic means of production such as 
land  and the importance of war as a potential foundation for social 
and political hierarchy fell into decline, no stable centralized form of 
political organization could be established.29 Political organization 
above the local level was based on a number of competing leaders 
who managed to rise to regional importance and become caudillos as a 
result of their capacity to conduct raids on Yucatan and organize sup-
plies from Belize, as well as on their military prowess, masculine 
(machista) performance and, possibly, rhetorical abilities. In many 
cases, although not all, these qualities were combined with a charisma 
gained by being considered especially close to the holy cross (or 
crosses). 
Although the ability of individual caudillos to consolidate their 
power may have been limited, the entire system, based on military 
organization in companies and the religous cult, worked quite well for 
several decades and allowed the Krusob to defend themselves against 
the Yucatecans for more than fifty years.30 I do not agree with 
Dumond (1985: 302-303) that this was a reflection more of Yu-
catecan weakness, but would argue that to a significant extent it was 
the result of a highly effective military organization capable of moti-
vating warriors to fight, the ability to procure the necessary supplies in 
a society with relatively few resources, and the development of spe-
cific forms of warfare (guerrilla tactics, ambushes, etc.) that even al-
lowed a triumph over the superior Yucatecan forces. Although 
Krusob political and religious organization was far from static, as 
Dumond (1985; 1997) and Jones (1974) have argued, and as I have 
attempted to demonstrate in this paper, and although their leaders 
were overthrown from time to time, there was an impressive continu-
ity in many cult-related religious practices. Although the cult con-
tained the potential for both religious and social fragmentation into 
various sub-units, at the same time it provided the basis for social 
cohesion beyond the levels of kinship and locality. 
 
                                                     
29 I plan to discuss the political economy of Krusob political organization in a 
future article. 
30 Thanks to Paul Sullivan (personal communication, 6/27/2002) for raising this 
point. 
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